A. INTRODUCTION
In numerous countries, stop and search powers are an open sore upon police-community relations, one which is increasingly being challenged through the courts. In the USA, the discriminatory practices associated with stop and search powers led to the coining of terms such as "driving while black" (more recently joined by "flying while brown"). While the scholarship on Scottish stop and search is burgeoning, significant gaps remain. This article will contribute to redressing this void by examining the legal basis for and compatibility of Scottish stop and search powers with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The analysis will highlight numerous failings in the current regime, some of which reveal incompatibility, some of which suggest that incompatible practices may occur (although there is insufficient data to confirm or dispel the thesis), others which "merely" evidence very poor practice.
The crux of all debates on stop and search is how to balance the discretion inherent in the power with the requirements of lex certa while also ensuring sufficient safeguards against abuse. In the language of the ECHR, how to ensure the power is prescribed by law? On the one hand, this discretion is an inherent and necessary part of the powers, and speaks to the primary purpose of stop and search: to permit the police a power, short of arrest, whereby they can confirm or allay suspicions of a person's involvement in criminality, thereby enabling the detection of crime. 10 This discretion, evident in all the powers, whether statutory or non-statutory, is further complicated by the location of stop and search within street policing, which is typically of "low visibility" and where the "norms and practices of the street level police officer take priority over outside regulation". 11 The discretion must be sufficiently bound to ensure the instruments are prescribed by law. This requirement of the ECHR, which reflects general principles of the rule of law, 12 has three aspects: (1) the power must have a basis in law; 13 (2) it must be sufficiently foreseeable so that people understand the potential consequences and can regulate their actions accordingly; 14 and (3) there must be "a measure of protection in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authorities".
15
Routine stop and search engages the right to a private life under Article 8 of the ECHR. 16 Depending on the circumstances, Articles 10 and 11 (freedom of assembly and speech) and Article 14 (prohibition on the discriminatory application of the ECHR rights and freedoms) may also be engaged. Despite the ECtHR's suggestion in Gillan v United Kingdom that the coercive nature of the stop was "indicative of a deprivation of liberty", it seems unlikely that Article 5 is engaged by a routine stop and search.
17
The "threshold" where a restriction on movement, protected under Protocol 4, Article 2 (which has not been ratified by the UK), becomes a deprivation of liberty is notoriously amorphous, being "merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance". suspicionless statutory powers, suspicion-based statutory, and the non-statutory power. The key issue in relation to the suspicionless statutory powers is whether the system of authorisation sufficiently balances the virtually unfettered discretion of officers regarding who to select to stop. Suspicion-based statutory powers raise concerns regarding the definition of reasonable suspicion, the requirements relating to officers' conduct during the encounter and systems of review more generally. In addition to issues regarding consent, the absence of safeguards to limit the risk of the arbitrary deployment of the non-statutory power raises significant concerns.
B. SCOTTISH STOP AND SEARCH POWERS
(1) Suspicion-based statutory powers
Stop and search powers fall into two types: statutory and non-statutory. The former may be further sub-divided into suspicionless powers and those triggered by reasonable suspicion. To begin with this final category, which constitutes the vast majority of the statutory class, the powers tend to follow a similar formula: the police may stop and search a person if they reasonably suspect an offence has been, is being, or is about to be committed, or that the person is carrying a prohibited article. Some powers extend also to vehicles or vessels, drivers and passengers. The statutes use a variety of wording, such as "reasonable suspicion", "reasonable grounds", and "reasonable cause". 22 Because there is no practicable difference between these phrases, and for the sake of clarity, this article will refer only to reasonable suspicion.
There are stop and search powers in relation to persons suspected of "core" criminal offences 40 The authorisation may last up to twenty-four hours and can be extended by a further twenty-four hours if it appears to a superintendent or more senior officer that it is expedient to do so.
41
The trigger for authorisation under section 47A(1) of the 2000 Act is that an assistant chief constable or chief constable reasonably suspects that an act of terrorism will take place and the authorisation is necessary to prevent it. The authorisation must be approved by the Secretary of State within forty-eight hours or it will lapse, while not affecting the legality of actions taken in the interim. 42 The authorisation may last up to fourteen days and extend up to the entire force area, although it should be no longer nor geographically broader than necessary. 43 Once authorised, a uniformed officer may stop a person and search for evidence that such person is a terrorist or stop a vehicle and search it for evidence that it is being used in connection with terrorism.
44
There is a third suspicionless stop and search power (under Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act) which will not be further discussed here, for three reasons. 45 First, it applies to ports and 39 Note that an additional limb in England and Wales permits an authorisation if the officer reasonably believes that (a) an incident involving serious violence has taken place, (b) a dangerous instrument or offensive weapon used in the incident is being carried in the locality, and (c) the authorisation is expedient to find such item (s 60(1)(aa) 
C. COMPATIBILITY WITH THE ECHR
Turning now to the compatibility of the powers, the main issue in relation to all categories is whether they are prescribed by law. 48 This concern is particularly acute in relation to suspicionless statutory and the non-statutory powers. The test of reasonable suspicion is relevant to the suspicion-based statutory powers and consent to non-statutory powers. There are additional issues, particularly in relation to suspicion-based powers, which are better viewed as bad practice rather than breaches of the ECHR, which shall also be highlighted. 46 Although subject to reasonable suspicion, the powers to stop and search under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 sch 2, paras 2-3 and under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2015 sch 1, para 2 bear more resemblance to sch 7 for these reasons. 47 Toolkit (2014) 8.
48
Note the term "in accordance with the law" is used interchangeably with "prescribed by law". There is no difference between these expressions, which are translations of the same French expression "prévues par la loi" (Sunday Times para [48] ). in order to determine the approach taken by the court. 49 The subsequent sections will assess whether the statutory and non-statutory powers breach the ECHR.
(1) Suspicionless statutory powers
In Gillan, the power conferred by section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 ("the 2000 Act") (the predecessor to the currently applicable section 47A, which replaced it) was held not to be prescribed by law. Less than two years later, "preventive searches" (broadly analogous to the searches authorised under section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994) were held in Colon to be prescribed by Dutch law and justifiably to infringe Article 8, although it is notable that the complaint was restricted to whether effective judicial remedies were available. The respective powers conferred by the British and Dutch legislation will be briefly outlined, before assessing the contrasting outcomes.
Under section 44, a senior police officer could authorise the use of the power if he considered doing so "expedient for the prevention of terrorism". 50 The Secretary of State had to confirm the authorisation, which could extend across the force area and last for up to twenty-eight days. 51 Once authorised, a uniformed officer could stop and search any person, vehicle or passenger therein within the authorised area for articles of a kind that could be used in connection with terrorism.
52
In relation to "preventive searches" under Dutch law, a Local Council could, under the Municipalities Act section 151b, pass a bye-law enabling the Burgomaster (Mayor) of a municipality to designate an area of the city as a "security risk area" if there was a "public order disturbance caused by the presence of weapons" or fear of this occurring. 53 Colon concerned the Burgomaster of Amsterdam, who after consultation with the head of the regional police and the public prosecutor, had made designations for successive six and (later) twelve month periods. 54 Thereafter, the public prosecutor was permitted to designate a twelve hour period in which the police could conduct suspicionless stop and search on persons or vehicles, the object of the search being offensive weapons.
Refusal to submit to a search, or the obstruction of an officer in the exercise of either power, was a criminal offence punishable by up to six months' imprisonment and/or a level 5 fine (in relation to section 44 of the 2000 Act) 55 or up to three months' imprisonment and/or a fine (in relation to preventive searches).
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The Dutch authorisations were more narrowly tailored, owing to the system of double-designations. The ECtHR also highlighted the greater democratic control evident in
Colon. 57 Presumably this referred to the involvement of the Local Council and the greater ease with which the bye-law could be changed, as well as to the role of the public prosecutor.
However, the deployment of the power in both cases was remarkably similar, with virtually unfettered discretion afforded to officers. The key difference therefore appears to have been the practice. In Gillan the various accountability structures over the authorisation process had Gillan the disproportionate impact on "black" and ethnic minority communities, and that there were no terrorism related arrests subsequent to a search under the 2000 Act section 44, there was no discussion in Colon of these issues in relation to preventive searches.
59
Crucially, however, in Colon the Dutch government relied on two independent studies which showed that the use of weapons had decreased in the security risk areas and increased in relation to other areas.
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There was no equivalent "proof" of effectiveness proffered in Gillan. Three key points can be gleaned from these cases. First, routine stops and searches will engage Article 8 of the ECHR. Second, the greater the discretion in relation to whom to select to stop and search (what Ip terms "back-end" discretion 61 ), the greater the oversight that will be required, for example through a system of authorisation. As the oversight itself
involves discretion (what Ip terms "front-end" discretion), this must also be sufficiently controlled. Third, although the effectiveness of the scheme should not speak to whether the power is prescribed by law or not, being relevant to whether the infringement is justifiable, it appears from Colon to carry significant weight.
In light of Colon and Gillan, it may be asked: is the power conferred by section 47A
of the 2000 Act prescribed by law? The section is an improvement on its predecessor. The authorisation process has been tightened by raising the trigger from "expedient" to "necessary", with the added requirement that the authorising officer reasonably suspects that an act of terrorism will take place. 62 The accompanying Code of Practice, which in a departure from section 44 of the 2000 Act applies to the authorisation as well as deployment of the power, states that authorisations cannot be solely aimed at public reassurance, deterrence, or intelligence-gathering. 63 The maximum temporal limit has been reduced and a new requirement added that the geographical and temporal limits be no more than necessary to prevent the act of terrorism. 64 There is nominally a prohibition on "rolling" authorisations, although this is undermined by the contemplation of successive authorisations in the Code.
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In terms of back-end discretion, little has changed. While the object of the search has been altered, it remains exceptionally broad, largely because of the breadth of the definition of terrorism, 66 and a "clear risk of arbitrariness" remains. 67 Much will therefore depend on the actual use of the power, especially as the law is sufficiently broad and vague to permit a varied practice. This has been restrained in the extreme: notwithstanding events such as the London Olympics and the Glasgow Commonwealth Games, there has been no authorisation in Great Britain to date. 68 The sole authorisation occurred in Northern Ireland in the summer of 2013. 69 It appears therefore that the police are adhering to the spirit and not just the letter of the law. Notably, it seems probable that a degree of imminence between the suspected act of terrorism and the necessity of the authorisation has been implied. Given this approach, the power seems likely to be one prescribed by law. 71 The Court accepted that suspicionless stop and search will constitute an interference with Article 8. 72 As in Gillan, the power clearly has a basis in law, 73 the issue being whether there are sufficient safeguards to prevent its arbitrary use.
The Court outlined the relevant case-law, discussing Gillan, Colon and Beghal, which concerned stops under Schedule 7 of the 2000 Act, but did not explain how these cases applied to or could be distinguished from the case in hand. 74 The concluding discussion asserted the benefits of suspicionless powers, notwithstanding the inherent risk that they will be used in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. 75 The potential for discrimination was primarily addressed by noting that it is unlawful for officers to act in a discriminatory manner under Code A, the HRA section 6 and the Equality Act 2000. 76 This circular reasoning -that the police will not act unlawfully because it would be unlawful to do so -does not evidence sufficient safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of section 60 of the 1994 Act. Notably, all these provisions applied equally to section 44 yet the ECtHR explicitly voiced concerns over its impact on "black" and ethnic minority communities. 77 The Supreme Court concluded by highlighting features of the authorisation and deployment processes that "make it possible to judge whether the action was 'necessary in a democratic society…for the prevention of disorder or crime'". 78 While adequate review processes are a necessary element of legality, they cannot of themselves cure a power that is so broad as to risk arbitrariness. Moreover, the question of whether the interference is proportionate and therefore justifiable is secondary to the issue of whether the power is prescribed by law. The judgment fails to provide a clear exposition of the how the putative safeguards minimise the potential for the arbitrary exercise of the power.
The front-end discretion afforded to officers under section 60 of the 1994 Act is more circumscribed than section 44 of the 2000 Act was. As Kay, LJ noted in the Court of Appeal, the criteria for authorisation requires "that the authorising officer reasonably believes specified things relating to serious violence, dangerous instruments and offensive weapons" and this "incorporates an objective criterion which is more readily susceptible to judicial review". 79 In addition the temporal and geographical limits are narrower.
However, the back-end discretion, where the risk of arbitrary treatment is most acute, is largely equivalent. Section 60 has a narrower object for the search but, as the ECtHR stated in Gillan, this does little to fetter discretion as officers are not required to suspect the person is in possession of the object. 80 Although the Supreme Court noted that the ECtHR in Gillan was "[a]bove all…concerned at the breadth of the discretion given to the individual police officer", the judgment fails to explain how section 60 substantially differs in the discretion it affords individual officers.
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While a comparison with Gillan suggests that section 60 of the 1994 Act would not be prescribed by law, preventive searches muddy the waters, affording the same back-end discretion to officers with a virtually identical object of the search as section 60. Comparing the three powers, the back-end discretion is the virtually identical for each. The front-end discretion for section 60 is slightly more circumscribed than for section 44 but lacks any of Specifically in relation to section 60, data should be published on the number of authorisations and stops conducted, and these should be linked to the locality for which they are authorised. There may be grounds for some anonymization when publishing the data, however the full data set should be provided to the relevant oversight bodies (such as the Scottish Police Authority and the HMICS). The use of suspicionless statutory powers in relation to demonstrations has proven contentious at times in England and Wales, impacting both directly and through the chilling effect upon the rights to free assembly and speech, and guidance on the appropriate use of the power at protests should be issued. 
(2) Suspicion-based statutory powers
There are two, interlinked, issues with this category of powers: whether the main safeguard of reasonable suspicion is adhered to by the police and whether there are sufficient additional safeguards to prevent the arbitrary deployment of the powers. The latter may raise concerns about whether the powers are prescribed by law, but as detailed below, the arguments are relatively weak and are better considered as bad practice rather than incompatibility with the ECHR. Deploying one of these powers without reasonable suspicion would be illegal and the officer may be committing actionable wrongs, in relation to assault and wrongful detention.
Evidence secured through the search may also be deemed inadmissible, although the court can excuse irregularity in the method by which the evidence was obtained. 
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O'Hara provides a hybrid test:
In part it is a subjective test, because [the officer] must have formed a genuine suspicion in his own mind … In part also it is an objective one, because there must also be reasonable grounds for the suspicion which he has formed.
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The suspicion must be in the officer's mind at the time the power is deployed, and must be based on facts known at that time. 100 Suspicion may be based on evidence that would be inadmissible in court. 101 As reaffirmed in recent High Court judgments, instructions from a superior cannot, without more, constitute reasonable suspicion, as the officer conducting the search will have no objective grounds upon which to base a suspicion. The "Toolkit" defines reasonable suspicion as suspicion that is backed by a reason capable of articulation and is something more than a hunch or a whim … The officer has to have intelligence or information supporting the reason for the search such as the person slurring their words or that the person is showing behaviour that is leading to the officer's suspicion.
103
This fails clearly to emphasise the need for officers to have formed the suspicion themselves.
There is also no explicit linkage between the suspicion and the object of the search.
Suspecting someone of some criminal behaviour is not sufficient as grounds for a statutory stop and search: the suspicion must relate to the object of that particular power. Contrast PACE Code A para 2.2, where the test for reasonable suspicion requires:
Firstly, the officer must have formed a genuine suspicion in their own mind that they will find the object for which the search power being exercised allows them to search…; and (ii) Secondly, the suspicion that the object will be found must be reasonable. This means that there must be an objective basis for that suspicion based on facts, information and/or intelligence which are relevant to the likelihood that the object in question will be found, so that a reasonable person would be entitled to reach the same conclusion based on the same facts and information and/or intelligence."
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The "Toolkit" goes on to list a number of factors: intelligence on the location, suspect, friends, families, or associates; previous convictions or knowledge of subject; PNC/CHS warning signals; the suspect's course of conduct, demeanour, or explanation as to why they are at that location; the suspect's clothing, possessions, or -where possession of alcohol is a factor -age; and recent incidents (responding to a gang fight where weapons were mentioned).
105 While these may all be relevant, the majority must be coupled with additional information in order to provide adequate grounds for suspicion, and the Toolkit should be 103 At 6. 104 Para 2.2 (emphasis in the original). 105 At 6. explicit on this point. For example, the mere fact of a person's associations or previous convictions cannot provide reasonable suspicion. 106 Overall, the "Toolkit's" guidance is at best ambiguous and at worst misleading. Key aspects of the legal test are not made clear and the confusing list of factors may encourage officers to rely on irrelevant or insufficient grounds.
The second, related, issue concerns the regulation of officer conduct during and after the search. As the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure commented in 1981, when assessing stop and search powers in England and Wales, there is a "risk that the criterion [for reasonable suspicion] could be loosely interpreted". The Commission concluded that "the notification of the reason for the search to the person who has been stopped, the recording of searches by officers, and the monitoring of the records by supervising officers would be the most effective and practical ways of reducing the risk". 107 It also recommended that all officers provide the person stopped with the officer's name and number. 108 Currently, Scottish practice fails to meet these minimum standards. An exceptionally light-touch approach to regulating officer conduct is taken, with inconsistency in the rules that exist.
Requiring an officer to inform the person stopped of the grounds for the stop and search provides a check upon the arbitrary exercise of the power, as well as being important in ensuring the person's satisfaction with the encounter. 109 Where found in Scottish legislation, the requirement to provide grounds only applies when the officer moves to search Again in contrast to the position in the rest of the UK, Scottish police do not need to issue any form of written record to the person stopped. The issuing of these "stop forms" was instituted in the rest of the UK following the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, and a form must be given to all persons stopped and searched at the time, unless there are exceptional circumstances. 115 These stop forms were broadly welcomed by the public in the pilot study, who perceived the key benefits as having information on "the reason for the stop; the name of the officer in case they wanted to complain; and the explanation of police powers and public rights". these trials as "a positive development for stop and search practice as they help to increase its transparency".
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While the current focus on stop and search has led to a number of ad hoc forms of scrutiny, 118 all are exceptional one-offs. 119 A systematic and routine review structure is urgently needed. A major impediment to effective post-hoc scrutiny in Scotland is the lack of rigorous recording requirements, coupled with the absence, until 2014, of published data. 120 While bare statistics will neither prove nor disprove bad practice, they are a vital cog in the accountability wheel and can aid in identifying areas of concern that merit further investigation. Routine post-hoc scrutiny is particularly important, as research shows that individuals tend not to make formal complaints against the police, even when dissatisfied.
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Of course, such data must be relevant and accurate. HMICS have stated that they "do not have confidence in the stop and search data currently held by Police Scotland" and that the stop and search database requires substantial improvements to be fit for purpose.
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Officers are currently obliged to record: their name; the date, location, and time of the stop and search; whether it is statutory or non-statutory; whether any items were detected;
and, if so, what they were. In addition, they may record the stopped person's details, for instance date of birth. While this is fine as far as it goes, there is insufficient detail for effective accountability. 123 It is imperative that the grounds for reasonable suspicion be recorded so that the major safeguard over the suspicion-based statutory powers can be evaluated. 124 The legislative power used should also be recorded. This would feed into the While the current approach falls well short of best practice, is it compatible with the ECHR? The absence of a systematic review structure and the difficulties in enforcing one,
given the inadequate data recording and the absence of stop forms, heighten the risk of the arbitrary deployment of the powers. This, alongside the lack of a requirement for officers to provide their name or warrant number, may also complicate attempts to seek redress in the courts. However, it is doubtful that these issues, even in conjunction with the absence of a detailed code of practice, would lead the ECtHR to conclude that the powers were not prescribed by law. The powers are not unfettered: they are bounded by the requirement of reasonable suspicion in relation to the object of the search. While it is arguable how effective this is in practice, there are routes for redress through the domestic courts if a search is conducted without reasonable suspicion, notwithstanding the inevitable difficulties of proving such a claim. Given that preventive searches were prescribed by law, it seems highly improbable that suspicion-based statutory ones would fall at that hurdle.
125 Para 1.3. 126 See PACE 1984 s 67(10) and (11).
(3) Non-statutory powers
Turning finally to the most problematic category, non-statutory stops and searches, the major issue is whether the power is ECHR compliant.
In the absence of a statutory power, it is the consent of the stopped person that ensures the police have not committed one or more actionable wrongs (such as assault). While the question of consent depends on individual circumstances, current practice raises concerns in relation to whether consent was informed and voluntary, and whether all persons stopped had capacity to consent.
Following Brown v Glen, police are not required to inform the person that consent to the stop and search may be withheld. 127 Lord Sutherland reasoned that:
Where … the police are making general enquiries and the person with whom they are dealing has not reached the stage where he could be described as a suspect, except in the most general and nebulous sense, the police are not obliged to caution the person as to his answers to questions and there appears to us to be no logical reason why they should be obliged to issue any caution to accompany a request for a search to be carried out when it must be perfectly obvious that the answer to that request may be either yes or no.
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The analogy with stop and question is misplaced. The public nature of a search and the accompanying potential of "an element of humiliation and embarrassment" was singled out by the ECtHR as "compounding the seriousness of the interference" with the right to a private life under Article 8 of the ECHR. 129 Whether the search is of the person's pockets, or a full "pat-down", perhaps after outer clothing has been removed, this is necessarily more intrusive than asking someone a question. when non-statutory stops and searches were permitted -supports the view that the authoritative character of the police impacts upon people's choice to consent, finding that the combination of the lack of knowledge and power on the part of the person stopped, the unwillingness of police to give information, and their tendency to "bamboozle" the suspect meant that "'consent' … frequently consists of acquiescence based on ignorance" against a background of "contextual irrelevance of rights and legal provisions". 137 This, and other answer to that request may be either yes or no" to be simply inaccurate. 138 A requirement to inform the person of their right to refuse cannot be viewed as an unreasonable burden upon the police. 139 As Justice Marshall concluded, to do otherwise would permit "a game of blindman's buff, in which the police always have the upper hand, for the sake of nothing more than the convenience of the police".
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It is also worth noting that research shows that at least some officers viewed refusing a search as grounds to move to a statutory stop and search. 141 This is clearly incorrect and serves to undermine the entire concept of consent as the basis for the non-statutory power in such cases.
The other major issue with consent arises from the extensive use of the non-statutory power on children. Since June 2014 the power is nominally not meant to be exercised on those aged under twelve. 142 Previously, children as young as six were subjected to nonstatutory stops and searches, with approximately 500 children aged under ten stopped and searched in 2010. 143 Indeed, "young people are significantly more likely to be searched on a non-statutory basis". 144 It is questionable whether a young child can fully understand the consequences of permitting the police to search them. If they are not fully informed, consent is not valid.
A more basic problem is whether young, especially very young, children can in law consent to a non-statutory search. Certainly those under eight -the age of criminal responsibility -must be incapable of such consent. It is, however, difficult to establish where a bright-line may lie for older children. One overarching problem is how to frame the interaction, as criminal or civil law. On the one hand, consent enables the police to perform actions that would otherwise be delicts; on the other, the child may be subject to criminal prosecution due to evidence found during the search. Whichever framework is used, there are no direct precedents. Under sections 1-2 of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, children under the age of sixteen have legal capacity to enter into any "transaction" if it is of a kind that is normally entered into by persons of that age and circumstances. There is (thankfully) no need to argue that the substantial usage of stop and search on young persons means it is a "normal transaction", as the 1991 Act does not alter the delictual or criminal responsibility of any party, both of which are potentially engaged. Therefore, the common law age of consent may be the appropriate benchmark: this is the age of minority, or puberty, fourteen for boys and twelve for girls. 145 In 2010, subject to the caveats regarding data (in)accuracy, 26,000 children under fourteen were stopped and searched under the nonstatutory power. 146 If the common law age of consent is the appropriate test, many of these were unlawful. Even if this is not the correct test, and these children had the capacity to consent, for the reasons above doubts remain regarding the validity of the consent.
People may also lack capacity to consent through, for example, mental illness or intoxication. Neither category has been flagged as problematic in empirical research to date.
However, given the use of the power in relation to alcohol and young persons, its use on intoxicated youths seems possible if not probable.
Leaving consent to one side, it is doubtful that non-statutory stop and search is prescribed by law. While non-statutory stop and search has (obviously) no statutory base, there is no requirement of codification, and as the use of this power has been acknowledged in case-law there will be a basis in law. 147 However, it is questionable whether the power is "formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen -if need be, with appropriate advice -to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail". 148 In particular the lack of a requirement to inform the person that they may refuse the search and the fact that some officers view refusal as grounds for a suspicion-based statutory stop cast doubt upon its foreseeability. Also, Malone v United imagine a court … feeling constrained in holding … the 'lawfulness' test to include nonproscription as well as positive proscription".
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Even if the foreseeability requirement is met, there are clearly insufficient safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of the power. The absence of adequate recording or review mechanisms, discussed above, means that the only significant safeguard is consent. While consent could bring the power within a different paradigm, it is highly unlikely that the ECtHR would view consent as a sufficient safeguard, particularly given the issues outlined above. Although not on all fours with Colon or Gillan -notably, the non-statutory power nominally lacks the coercive element evident in both -this near-total absence of safeguards means there is a clear risk of arbitrariness. Unlike Colon, there is no independent evidence of effectiveness to which to point. Indeed, the detection rate for non-statutory stop and search, 
D. CONCLUSION
Scottish stop and search powers are in urgent of reform. This article has argued that two of the three categories -non-statutory and suspicionless statutory -are likely to be in breach of the ECHR, with the final category evidencing poor practice providing insufficient protection to the public and insufficient guidance to officers. Scotland would do well to incorporate the limitations to section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, detailed in the BUSS, to ensure it is prescribed by law. The non-statutory power is virtually unfettered and unlikely to be prescribed by law. It should be prohibited. Alternative powers exist which are subject to greater oversight and protection against arbitrary deployment. More generally, a detailed and binding code of practice should be adopted. This should include a clearer exposition of reasonable suspicion and require officers to, inter alia, inform the person stopped of their name or warrant number, the reason for the search, and to issue them with a stop form. A systematic and routine review structure is urgently needed and data collection and correlation must be improved to facilitate this.
There is a broader lesson here, namely the need for routine publication of accurate and appropriate data on the use of police powers. A spotlight was shone on stop and search through Murray's doctoral research, with her FOI requests revealing the substantial rate of stop and search in Scotland and prompting her deeper analysis. Oversight of such important powers should not rely on the chance choice of a research topic (one which was not even her original choice). Greater transparency and routine publication of core data will assist both oversight bodies, such as the Scottish Police Authority and HMICS, and academics in identifying potentially problematic trends or practices that merit closer scrutiny and those evidencing best practice.
